Today, Sri Lankan authorities declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), claiming that Tamil Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed while attempting to escape the war zone in an ambulance which crashed. His sons were killed earlier. Prabhakaran had urged the last remaining Tigers to swallow cyanide pills. It appears he neglected to follow his own prescription.

David Miliband prepares for a spot of liberal intervention
One good thing has emerged from the terrible Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka: UK Foreign Minister David Miliband’s effigy was burnt and thrown over the wall of the British High Commission today by a mob in Colombo protesting what they saw as British support for the LTTE. Until recently, Sri Lankan government forces had made extensive use of British-supplied arms, in a breathtaking display of hypocrisy by the former colonial overlords, whose bungling withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent was the root of this protracted ethnic conflict. The world’s media, excluded from the conflict zone, have fulminated as to the extent of civilian casualties, which were undoubtedly high, as though Iraq, Bosnia and, indeed, the continuing carnage in Afghanistan were somehow mitigated because they were allowed to be broadcast on the BBC, CNN and Sky (often with ‘embedded’ stooge journos). Gordon Brown, bomber of Kabul, promised ‘consequences.’ Hilary Clinton, supporter of the Iraq turkey shoot which saw over a hundred thousand civilians killed, a country decimated and over 4 million displaced, was similarly morally outraged. Liberal intervention is highly subjective, it appears.
Without in any way condoning or excusing the heavy bombardment of LTTE positions, which surely led to thousands of civilian deaths, the Sri Lankan government, with some logic and outside evidence, have consistently stated that they were between a rock and a hard place. The LTTE tactic of wholesale use of civilians as hostages and human shields, extending to threats and executions of family members of those who fled the war zone, made the conflict analogous to a vast and ghastly hijack siege. Tamil Tigers were killing and terrorising a hostage population. Rescuing them and eliminating the perpetrators was bound to result in ‘collateral damage’ (I hate that term). Doing nothing would perpetuate a crime against humanity by the friendly folks who invented suicide bombing and killed Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi.
What yardsticks can you use to measure good and bad in such a lose-lose scenario, and does this bear any relationship to trying to work out viable ways forward? If one dives into the blame game for a moment, it is clear that there is a history both of political misadventure as well as sordid geopolitics behind the conflict. Under British Colonial rule English was the main language of government, Tamils were preferred as colonial administrators and thus had many of the good jobs. After independence this was seen as not a good thing at all, and so Sinhalese was declared as the national language, effectively shutting out many Tamils from both the higher education system and the good jobs.
Bad turned to worse in the 1980s, when Sri Lanka started making noises about liberalising its economy and moved away from the influence of its mainland big brother India into the influence of the West. It can hardly be a coincidence that at this point Indian Federal as well as neighbouring State Tamil Nadu’s resources were mobilised to train up the Tigers into a fighting force that could launch its own air attacks and run its own navy. The picture changed as India warmed up to the idea of liberalising its own economy. Pivotally, after a Tamil Tiger killed Rajiv Ghandi, funding the Tigers did not seem like such a great wheeze, a problem that states often encounter when they fund insurgent groups – not that there are any red faces in the US or UK about this kind of thing, of course.
This left Sri Lanka, and particularly the civilians caught in the crossfire, in a deadly cycle of violence. In shades of Israel’s problems with proportional representation, extremists in Sri Lanka – including some slightly surreal buddhist fundamentalist groups, if you can swallow what seems like an oxymoron – were in the position of kingmakers, so moderate solutions were hard to put through. This is a pity, because the overwhelming majority of the civilian populations on both sides have favoured a federal solution for quite some time.
Assuming that the Sri Lankan government has ruthlessly crushed the LTTE once and for all - a big ‘if’ since the LTTE have been forced into guerilla mode before and have come back – where to go from here? The civilian population wanted no part of this conflict, which has been fueled from the outside to a great degree (the Tamil diaspora has been highly effective in mobilising the media, for example). The international community (and particularly India) really should feel an obligation to support a solution that ensures a lasting peace. Without economic aid, the potential for another peace-process shattering blood bath is still very high. The ‘international community’ can help by lending the immediate means for the Sri Lankan government to feed, resettle and shelter the Tamil refugees, no questions asked. The next step is to invest in economic communities to give them firstly a genuine means of helping themselves. The third step is to engage in dialogue and reconciliation that will ensure proportional representation and participation in Sri Lanka’s democratic process.
International bodies have by and large proved wanting in supplying effective solutions thus far. Sri Lanka itself, both morally and practically, needs to lead in the process of making life fairer for peace-inclined Tamils. Carping aside, there is no real evidence that it has any intention of shirking or sidestepping this duty. In the context of dog-eat-dog geopolitics, where World Police pontificate and assuage their sense of self-righteousness by dropping tonnes of democracy from 35,000 feet, it may sound hopelessly naive and unfashionable, but the best way to help Sri Lanka solve its problems may be to allow those best equipped to understand this local problem to try and find local solutions. In passing, it should be noted that the UK government, amongst the most vocal international critics of the unquestionably deadly assault on LTTE strongholds, have consistently exported arms to Sri Lanka since 1997, when New Labour came to power, promising arms export limitations, but leading the country into three wars, at least two of aggression and exporting weapons to several conflict zones. Miliband, the ridiculous Labour Foreign Affairs Select Committee, a kind of warzone tourist club, and their unelected master, Gordon Brown, should be ashamed, but they’re not. Hence the effigies in Colombo.